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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the Defendants1 recitation of the facts, they 
improperly characterize certain critical testimony and totally 
misstate other pertinent facts. 
In describing the Defendants1 investment in the deep 
test well, they state that Mr. Strand offered to the Defendants 
a forty percent interest in the Mingo 13-13 partnership in 
return for three things. In the first place there is no 
evidence in the record to support any factual conclusion except 
that Mr. Strand offered the 40% interest for payment of $250,000 
cash and a promissory note for $250,000. In fact, at trial, Mr. 
Hammons testified that the agreement between the parties was 
that the Defendants would pay $250,000 in cash and issue a 
promissory note for an additional $250,000 as consideration for 
the receipt of the 40% interest. (R. 460-461, Is. 15-25; 1-8). 
And, Mr. Hammons further testified that there were no additional 
agreements regarding the investment. (R. 461, Is. 4-5). 
Notwithstanding this testimony, Defendants represented 
to this Court in their Statement of Facts that the Hammons 
agreed to merely convert the status of the original $100,000 
from that of the loan to an investment in consideration for the 
conveyance of the 40% interest. At trial, Hammons did not 
qualify in any manner the conversion of the initial loan as 
1 
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suggested by the Defendants upon appeal. As Mr. Hammons 
explained. 
Q. What was your contribution or your 
consideration for your investment in the deep test? 
A. Well, we had put in $250,000 cash and it was 
explained to us by Mr. Strand and by Bruce Wisan and 
Lynn Daines that we would be able to take a $250,000 
additional tax credit by agreeing to pay the driller, 
or the partnership, an additional or like amount, say, 
in this instance as it turns out, was an additional 
two-hundred fifty, that would be paid exclusively out 
of the proceeds of the well. And we had that 
conversation a dozen times. I can remember it as vivid 
as anything. If there's no oil there's no payback. 
Q. So there was $250,000 that was invested in 
cash, in the deep test. 
A. That is correct. 
(R. 448-449, Is. 17-22; 1-5). 
When asked directly if there was an agreement between 
Defendants and Plaintiffs concerning the conversion of the 
initial loan into an investment, Mr. Hammons answered 
unequiovically that the agreement between the parties was that 
the initial loan was to be converted into the investment. (R. 
468, Is. 18-25). 
Similarly the Defendants state that the second of the 
three things allegedly given by the Hammons for the investment 
in the oil well, was that the Hammons advanced to Mr. Strand an 
additional $150,000 in cash in return for the execution of a 
second promissory note in the amount of $250,000. Again, in 
direct contradiction to this factual allegation, Mr. Hammons' 
2 
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testimony at trial established that the acceptance of the 
Plaintiffs1 offer and part performance of the investment 
contract took place weeks before the second promissory note was 
executed and had nothing to do with that note. As Mr. Hammons 
explained: 
Q. And the investment decision was made prior to 
this promissory note. 
A. Which promissory note? 
Q. To the second promissory note. 
A. Yes, to the $250,000 promissory note. 
(R. 471, Is. 17-21). 
In fact, Hammons testified at trial that the second 
promissory note didnft relate to that investment decision but 
rather, stood on its own. (R. 445, Is. 22-25). 
The Defendants next serious inappropriate 
characterization of the evidence relates to the 1981 and 1982 
tax returns for Mingo Oil 13-13 partnership. Contrary to the 
assertion of Defendants that those returns and related documents 
did not evidence their ownership interest, the accountant for 
both parties testified that in fact the income tax filings, for 
those years did contain that evidence. (R. 411, Is. 1-21; R. 
413, Is. 7-22). 
Finally, Defendants again misstate the evidence when 
they represent to the Court that during May, 1982, David Hammons 
3 
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made demand on the notes. The record reflects that in May of 
1982, Mr. Hammons, rather than make demand on the notes, offered 
to return all the Defendants1 interests in return for the money 
invested. (R. 473, Is. 2-13). 
ARGUMENT ONE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE DELIVERY OF THE $150,000 
AS PAYMENT OF THE INVESTMENT PRICE CAN NOT 
CONSTITUTE CONSIDERATION FOR THE EXECUTION 
OF THE $250,000 PROMISSORY NOTE 
In an attempt to support the trial court's decision 
that the giving of $150,000 constituted adequate consideration 
for the $250,000 promissory note, the Defendants argue that the 
parties entered into a binding agreement when David and Herb 
Hammons delivered to Michael Strand and Mingo Oil Company 
$150,000 in cash in return for the execution of a $250,000 
promissory note payable to Electro Technical Corporation. This 
argument is not supported by the record in this case or the law 
governing the transaction in question. 
At the trial, Mr. Hammons testified that following 
extensive negotiations the Defendants accepted the Plaintiffs1 
offer to acquire a 40% interest in the deep test well. As 
testified to by Mr. Hammons, the agreement of the parties called 
for the payment by Defendants of $250,000 in cash and the 
issuance of a $250,000 promissory note to Mingo Oil Company for 
the purchase of the 40% interest. (R. 460-461, Is. 1-25; 1-8). 
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The clear and unequivocal testimony of Mr. Hammons 
during the trial established that this decision to convert the 
prior $100,000 loan and pay the additional monies was made in 
the middle of December, 1981. (R. 442, Is. 17-23). Obviously 
this decision to invest in the oil well had to follow a prior 
offer by Plaintiffs to sell the 40% interest under those terms. 
Not only did Hammons testify that the decision to 
invest was made in the middle of December, he further testified 
that acceptance of Plaintiffs1 offer was accompanied on December 
18, 1981, by partial performance in the form of the conversion 
of the loan which had been evidenced by the $100,000 promissory 
note dated December 1, 1981. (R. 470, Is. 14-15). Upon this 
expression of assent, which by the admission of Defendants was 
made on or about December 18, 1981, a contractual obligation was 
created between the parties. See, B. B. & S. Construction Inc. 
v. Stone, 535 P.2d 271, 275 N.8 (Alaska, 1975). 
At the time the offer to purchase the 40% interest was 
accepted by the Defendants, they were obligated to pay to 
Plaintiffs the agreed upon cash payment of $250,000. (R. 445, 
Is. 9-21). Therefore, the delivery of the $150,000 to Plaintiff 
Strand on December 30, 1981, as partial payment of the purchase 
price, could not constitute consideration for the execution of 
the $250,000 promissory note or his promise to repay the amount 
of money evidenced by that note. 
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It is well established law that an agreement to do that 
which a person is already required to do by contract can not 
constitute consideration for a new promise. See Baggs v. 
Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah, 1974); Boardman v. Dorsett, 
685 P.2d 615 (Wash. App., 1984); Hurley v. Hurley, N.M., 615 
P.2d 256 (1980); Keil v. Glacier Park, Inc., 614 P.2d 502 (Mont, 
1980). Once the Defendants accepted the Plaintiffs' offer to 
purchase the interest in the oil well they became legally 
obligated to pay the additional $150,000 to Plaintiffs. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the delivery of the $150,000 as 
part payment for that purchase can not constitute consideration 
for the subsequent execution by Plaintiff Strand of the $250,000 
promissory note. Under the facts presented in the present case, 
the $250,000 promissory note is unenforceable for lack of 
consideration. 
The present case is analogous to the case of VanTassell 
v. Lewis, 222 P.2d 350 (Utah 1950). In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court was asked by Plaintiffs to set aside a sale of 
property to Defendant Lewis. In VanTassell, the Plaintiffs 
argued that because Lewis had failed to fulfill a promise to 
them to provide a permanent contract for the purchase of a 
substitute dairy farm, the Court should undue the purchase by 
Lewis of Plaintiffs1 ranch. In VanTassell, Lewis proposed to 
purchase the VanTassell ranch for $10,000 and the assumption of 
6 
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a 58,000 „.:ie and mortgage r order to facilitate the purchase 
The VanTassells i ntended to sel ] Hhrt • '"uinlli in '•••!".»•. 
mone] > < which Lewis * • realtor lad 
advertised for sale. payment by Lewis "he $10,0no the 
VanTassells endorsed the check I I 
tii rurther negotiate for the purchase of the dairy 
farm, California, Plaintiffs signed i preliminary 
agreement ourchase I In1 nihility l 11 Il Lewis p r o mi s e (j| ^0 
iretuLi i fornia and draw up a permanent contract regarding 
that purchase. Lewis failed to fulfil] this promis* 
dairy y the
 s ut>j e c oreclosure 
proceeding in which the VanTassells lost their interest. 
i k'nyii ) ii" Lelitil requested by the VanTassells the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that the contract for the purchase 
of ranch —- - had been entered 
1.1 Lewis promised to obtain the permanent 
contract for the purchase of the dairy farm. As the Utah 
Supreme Court explained: 
••When L e w i s allegedly made his promise, the 
Plaintiffs were under contract to convey to him the 
Duchesne property for ai I agreed price. Under no 
conceivable theory can the doing of an act which a 
party is already obligated to do, constitute 
consideration for a n^w promise on the part of the 
other party." 
Id, 222 P.2d at 355 
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Similarly, in the present case, the Defendants were 
under contract to deliver to Plaintiffs the $150,000 for the 
purchase of the interest in the oil well prior to the time that 
Plaintiff Strand executed the $250,000 promissory note. To echo 
the prior holding of the Utah Supreme Court, in VanTassell, 
under no conceivable theory can the delivery of that money which 
the Defendants were already obligated to pay, constitute 
consideration for the new promise, to wit, the execution of the 
promissory note and associated promise to repay the $250,000. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF STRAND WHEN PLACED 
IN CONTEXT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURTfS DECISION 
In the latter part of their first argument, the 
Defendants refer to the testimony of Plaintiff Strand in support 
of the trial court's conclusion that the $150,000 payment 
constitutes consideration for the promissory note. However, 
when the referenced testimony is returned to its context it 
provides no support for Defendants' position. 
The Plaintiffs have always contended that the second 
promissory note in the amount of $250,000 represented a renewal 
of the initial $100,000 obligation and an additional loan of 
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$150,000 from Defendants to Mingo Oil Company. (R. 340, Is. 
5...9; R, j , 6 / x5, i/-^uj .* 
While Mr. Strand testified that he had offered to sell 
40% of the December ™ , 
Ii« 1 estlt d v.,*.,., , divestment decision had been made prior to 
the delivery 3f thr- : 100 by Herb Hammons ±u iact 
Strand tes r ™*s accepted by 
Defendants .-. mid-February, 1982 , 
Based (in I his understanding ^ the factual 
circumstances involved In tills case, Mr trand testified that 
$150,000 was partial consideration for 
promissory note. He also testified 
that subsequent issuance v • Defendants 
decided onvert * * 'mi i n 
i r r r* • • • - release Plaintiffs from any 
and all obligations under the notes. (R, 341, Is. 8-19). 
•j . * j.dence presented by Mr. Hammons at trial was In 
direct contradiction to the Plaintiff's testimony and 
established a factual scenario in '• s 
]
 The fact that the second note was for the total amount 
of the first and second payments to wit, $250,000, seems so 
obvious as to bely contradiction. However, Hammons asserted at 
trial and the trial court obviously believed his testimony that 
there was no relation between the two obiigations. 
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default under the terms of the initial $100,000 note, Defendants 
decided to invest additional money and converted the prior 
$100,000 loan into the purchase of a 40% interest in the oil 
well. Mr. Hammons testified that this decision and part 
performance of the investment agreement was made on or about the 
18 day of December, 1981. Under the Defendants1 rendition of 
the facts this investment decision predated the execution of the 
$250,000 note by almost two weeks. Mr. Hammons also testified 
that at no time did the Defendants loan Mingo Oil Company any 
money. (R. 487, Is. 19-23). 
The trial court obviously did not believe Mr. Strand's 
testimony and accepted Defendants' representations of the facts 
as true in granting them judgment on their Crossclaim. The 
Defendants should not be heard at this time to rely on 
Plaintiff's testimony concerning facts that were rejected by the 
trial judge to support their position on appeal. 
If Defendants had loaned Plaintiffs $150,000 on 
December 30, as testified to by Mr. Strand, that payment would 
have constituted consideration for the issuance of the 
promissory note. Defendant Hammons testimony is clear that no 
such loan was made. (R. 487, Is. 19-23). If as testified to by 
Mr. Hammons the payment of the $150,000 was in furtherance of 
their prior acceptance of Plaintiffs' investment offer then the 
payment can not constitute consideration for the note. 
10 
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ARGUMENT THREE 
T H E DECISI()N T Q C 0 N V E R T T H E L Q A N T 0 m INVESTMENT 
CONSTITUTED AN ENFORCEABLE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
RATHER THAN MERELY A CHANGE IN THE "LABEL" USED 
TO DESCRIBE THE AMOUNT 
I i p'lpi nil' .1" I Ml -i i nt- ! (• f '. I'i'js j f; i.i)ii i.hat t h e i n i t i a l 
*- converted into ^ investment and therefore the 
note evidencing tha* nenforceable -s-4- - \s cirque 
t; - l crotn a K-- * investment 
"was merely change label used ^o describe amounts 
given." This argument xo aonsensica xurf, MI.I I ,' M I H 
record i n \ I i s <;ise. 
Throughout -
Hit-' parties agreed to convert the initial loar. -.•... 
an investment i 1 deep test well, : iiscussina , 
parties convert MM in to ,11111 1 -.-.'^e. - tfammons 
explained: 
A. . . . it became obvious, or obvious to us, 
that we not were going to be repaid by the terms of the 
note ($100,000) on the 10th, and that the middle of the 
month came and went and he still didn't have any money, 
we found out that the security he had given us on this 
hundred thousand dollars was already encumbered more 
than the value of the security. We weighted the 
possibilities of putting additional money in rather 
than walking away from this or trying to seek its 
return. 
Q , Did you reach some decision about that"" 
A. if1 WIH did. Some further analysis and 
working with Mr. V\\ '.MI having conversations with 
AANG/ms 
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him and repeated conversations with Mr. Strand and his 
staff, which included a geologist that was on the staff 
with him, and the private independent or so-called 
independent information that he had in his office 
regarding the field we decided maybe we could go ahead 
and try to make the best out of a bad situation and 
invest the other money and plus get the tax credit. 
(R. 441-442, Is. 25-16), (emphasis added). 
Defendants' decision to convert the past due debt into 
an investment to "try to make the best out of a bad situation11 
by getting a significant equity interest in an oil well and 
substantial tax credits can not be characterized as merely a 
change in the "label" used to describe the amount given. By his 
testimony, Mr. Hammons admitted that the decision to make the 
investment in the oil well was made as an alternative to trying 
to seek the return of the initial $100,000 loan. This admitted 
abandonment of Defendants1 right to seek the return of the loan 
and instead "invest" the money in an equity position clearly 
shows an intent on the part of both parties to do more than 
merely change the "label" used to describe the amount given. 
On several occasions, Mr. Hammons testified that one of 
the reasons the Defendants decided to make the investment was 
the opportunity to take advantage of certain favorable tax 
credits. (R. 451, Is. 5-8). When questioned about the 
relationship of these tax credits to the conversion of the prior 
loan Mr. Hammons explained: 
AANG/ms 
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.' Q« • Now, if you had loaned the money to Mr 
Strand, would you have a tax shelter? 
A. Ik' , l don't think so. 
Q. So the tax shelter was created by the 
investment? 
A correct. 
(R. 451, Is. 14-18) 
This testimony points out the Defendants1 
understanding, mue - , tlicit 
c *^+- transaction and not simply its label had 
e changed for them advantage favorable ax 
consequences created nest ax 
oo i sequences were one of - , primary reasons for entering into 
the transaction , _, -"8). 
Therefore from, **~ Hammon's own admissions all -
elements of enforceable account and -atisfacti 
established. epaymenr riginal 
loan evidenced by *-> * promissory note for $100, > )efendants 
negotiated witr Plaintiffs + J - equity posi* 
test wel - interest 
the wel tz payment .- 5* *•* ;. ^ $2-
promissory note. : •> December, Defendants accept -
offer *»n *rtc\ paying additional 
monies eceivec the substitute performance, to wit, jonveyance 
of the 40% equity interest. There <MT |uesl ion lli.il, 
AANG/ms 
Defendants decision to accept the Plaintiffs offer constituted 
an enforceable accord and satisfaction of the initial debt. 
Defendants try to get around this evidence of a valid 
accord and satisfaction by arguing that Mr. Strand was willing 
to continue guaranteeing the return of the $100,000 to avoid 
collection efforts on the loan. Yet in his direct testimony, 
Hammons admitted that the decision to invest the money 
previously loaned was an alternative to trying to seek the 
return of that money or the repayment of the debt. (R. 442, Is. 
5-16). 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
HAMMONS1 TESTIMONY CONCERNING AN ORAL AGREEMENT 
TO REPAY THE MONIES INVESTED DOES NOT ESTABLISH 
THAT NO ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS ENTERED 
INTO BY THE PARTIES 
Hammons did testify at trial that Mr. Strand guaranteed 
the repayment or return of all monies the Defendants had 
invested in the oil well.2 However, Hammons repeatedly 
testified that the alleged guarantee agreement was an oral 
agreement between Mr. Strand and himself and his brother. 
Mr. Hammons explained: 
A. No, it was a verbal agreement between my 
brother and myself and Mr. Strand. 
2The testimony of Mr. Hammons was in direct 
contradiction that of Mr. Strand on this issue. Mr. Strand 
testified that at no time did he guarantee the repayment of 
350,000 to the Hammons. (R. 357, 1. 16-25). 
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Q if" was a verbal agreement that Mr. Strand 
would repay any money that you invested in the deep 
test, is that what you are saying? 
i , correct. 
(R. 4 5" . - : ' " 
Hammot , , -: 
,^ When did x; i*dw: conversations with Mr 
Strand relatina to "\e epayment of all the monies you 
had paid? 
h ' if, I , I ' M fiii""!, brother was killed May 9th. 
Q, May 9th. 
A . j. VJ. tod^ 
• I . ' * 
recall the substance 
., obviously x would have na. real 
distaste for what was going on. The wel^ he had 
gotten into all kinds of problems drilling a well, I 
had lost a brother and a partner, and I didn't want to 
be in it anymore. And I said, Mr. Strand, if you can 
pay me the monies we put into this deal back I will 
walk away no interest, no nothing, and you can have 
whatever it iq whatever we've got and he agreed to 
do that. 
* , if • « ! 
y, Did he say lie would repay that ? 
Do you have a written document where he said 
repay that money? 
, i don•t. 
472-473, Is. L - J J , J.S. j.- i. 
Thus, t a k e n as whole , t h e t e s t imony m Mr ti-iiiiiiimii«, 
e v i d p n r e s tin* i.irl \ hi.it \A\ Strand made some o r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
AANG /lis 
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to him that he would repay the money the Defendants had invested 
upon a return of their interest in the oil well. And, that 
testing establishes said representation was made by Mr. Strand 
long after the investment was made by Defendants. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
THEIR WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES CONCERNING THE CONVERSION OF THE 
INITIAL $100,000 DEBT INTO AN INVESTMENT 
In their brief, Defendants argue that Mr. Strand's 
testimony concerning the issuance of the second promissory note 
evidences that there was no meeting of the minds as to the 
alleged accord. Mr. Strand testified that the second note in 
the amount of $250,000 was issued for the renewal of the first 
obligation and the additional loan of $150,000. As Defendants 
note in their brief, Mr. Strand testified that Herb Hammons, a 
principal of Electro Technical Corporation and brother to David 
Hammons told him that the first note would be destroyed and the 
second note would include the first hundred thousand dollars and 
the second hundred and fifty thousand dollars (R. 339, Is. 1-4). 
While this testimony conflicts with that of Mr. 
Hammons, the conflict does not go the issue of the accord. Both 
Mr. Strand and Mr. Hammons testified that the initial loan of 
$100,000 was converted into an equity investment in the deep 
test well. The only conflict in the evidence relates to when 
AANG/ms 
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the loan was converted and not the fact that a substitute 
performance was intended by both parties.3 
If this court was persuaded by the logic of Defendants 
argument that the existing testimony evidences the lack of a 
meeting of the minds of the parties, it would have to conclude 
that there was never a meeting of the minds as to any of the 
contracts in question. Clearly, the testimony of Messrs. 
Hammons and Strand is in direct conflict on every critical issue 
presented in this case except the fact of an offer and 
acceptance creating the investment agreement and the conversion 
of the initial loan as partial payment of the purchase price. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
THE PRESENT APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS 
The arguments presented in both Appellants1 initial 
brief and this reply brief present serious issues of law and 
fact. Plaintiffs1 liability for the $250,000 promissory note 
was premised at the trial level upon the mere delivery of the 
money to Plaintiffs. Yet, if, as admitted to by Defendants, 
3Mr. Strand testified that the decision to convert the 
two loans that were involved in the second promissory note was 
made during late January or early February 1982. (R. 357, Is. 
25-29, Is. 3-6). Mr. Hammons testified that the conversion of 
the $100,000 promissory note occurred in the middle of December, 
1981. (R. 470, Is. 14-15). 
AANG/ms 
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they were obligated to pay that money for their investment in 
the oil well, then the delivery of the purchase price to 
Plaintiffs can not constitute consideration for the execution of 
the note. 
Similarly it is clear from the testimony of the 
Defendants sole witness, David Hammons, that the initial loan of 
$100,000 was converted into an equity investment in lieu of 
attempting to recover that money or enforcing the promissory 
note. The testimony of Mr. Hammons, therefore, establishes all 
the necessary element of an enforceable accord and satisfaction. 
These two arguments in themselves render this appeal 
not frivolous and provide a clear basis for vacating the trial 
court's judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment entered against Plaintiffs for payment of 
the two promissory notes plus interest and attorneys fees, 
should be reversed upon appeal, and the Plaintiffs1 claims 
against Defendants remanded to the District Court for a new 
trial. 
Dated this JZ^/ day of November, 1987. 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Appellants 
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